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In Kelly's Case l the appeals court of Massachusetts ruled that a 
claimant's emotional breakdown, caused by "identifiable stressful 
work-related incidents,"2 constituted a compensable "personal in­
jury"3 within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.4 In 
reaching its decision, the court distinguished claimant's mental injury 
both from gradually developing mental injuries and from those result­
ing from "wear and tear."5 The holding extended the trend in Massa­
chusetts workers' compensation cases toward compensating mental 
disorders caused by stressful incidents at work. 6 
II. FACTS 
Kelly had experienced no mental problems during her twenty­
two year employment and was well adjusted at home and at work. 7 
On Friday, August 19, 1977, her employer informed her that she 
would be laid off, and she became extremely upset and went home 
early. On Monday, August 22, 1977, her employer told her that she 
would be transferred to another department. The decision depressed 
Kelly. She developed severe chest pains and was taken to the hospital, 
where a physician examined her and prescribed medication for an 
emotional disorder. She returned to work six weeks later, beginning 
her work in the new department, but on October 14 she again devel­
oped severe chest pains and was taken to the hospital. Subsequently, 
1. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 462 N.E.2d 348 (1984). 
2. Id. at 732-33, 462 N.E.2d at 352 (quoting Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 18, 389 
N.E.2d 83, 86 (1979»; see infra note IS. 
3. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976). 
4. Id. ch. 152, § 1-86 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1984). 
5. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 730, 462 N.E.2d at 350. 
6. In In re Fitzgibbons' Case, 374 Mass. 633, 373 N.E.2d 1174 (1978), Massachusetts 
first allowed recovery "in cases involving mental disorders or disabilities causally connected 
to mental trauma or shock arising out of the employment." Id. at 637,373 N.E.2d at 1177. 
The court stated, "There is no valid distinction which would preclude mental or emotional 
disorders caused by mental or emotional trauma from being compensable." Id. See infra 
notes 51-58 and accompanying text. See also Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 413 
N.E.2d 711 (1980); Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 389 N.E.2d 83 (1979). 
7. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 728, 462 N.E.2d at 349. 
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she received regular psychiatric treatment for depression.8 The psy­
chiatrist who treated her testified that Kelly had been totally disabled 
since August 22, and that hearing of her layoff and transfer had caused 
her psychiatric problems.9 
In a hearing, a single member of the Industrial Accident Board lO 
found that Kelly had suffered no industrial injury I I within the mean­
ing of the Act on either August 22 or October 14, although her psychi­
atric problems were "caused by her hearing that she was to be laid off 
from one department and transferred to another."12 The reviewing 
board affirmed the decision. 13 Kelly appealed under section 11 of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act.14 The superior court, relying on Alba­
nese's Case, 15 reversed l6 and ordered payment of temporary total inca­
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 728, 462 N.E.2d at 349-350. 
10. The Industrial Accident Board, consisting of twelve members, each appointed to 
a twelve-year term, adjudicates contested cases, supervises agreements, and administers 
other phases of the Workmen's Compensation Act. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 23, § 15 
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984). No more than six members can be of the same political 
party. Id. Under the Act, if the parties cannot reach agreement, either party may request 
and receive a hearing with a single member of the Board, who may determine, after review­
ing all the evidence, to modify or terminate compensation. Id. ch. 152, § 7. "Any party 
aggrieved by an order filed under this section. . . may request the division to set the case 
for a hearing before another member thereof." Id. Under section 10, either party may file 
a claim for review of the decision by the single member. Id. § 10. The reviewing board, 
which consists of at least three other members of the Board, may hear evidence and revise 
the decision in whole or in part, or may refer the matter back to the single member. Id. A 
party still dissatisfied with a decision of the reviewing board may, under section 11, appeal 
to the superior court or the municipal court of Boston for judicial review. Id. § 11. The 
Board has no power to enforce its orders or decisions, but must instead seek enforcement in 
the superior court under section 11. Id. See generally 29 L. LOCKE, WORKMEN'S COM­
PENSATION § 462 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1984). 
11. The legislature defined industrial injury as "personal injury arising out of and in 
the course of' employment. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976). 
See 29 LOCKE, supra note 10, § 211. 
12. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 728, 462 N.E.2d at 350. 
13. Id. at 729, 462 N.E.2d at 350. 
14. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 11 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984). 
15. 378 Mass. 14,389 N.E.2d 83 (1979). Albanese held the position of foreman for 
twenty years. Three years before his claim, the owner sold the business, and thereafter 
employees attempted to unionize. Albanese found himself caught in the conflict between 
management and workers. Three times the plant manager told him to announce curtail­
ment of special employee benefits, and Albanese reluctantly complied. Each time the man­
ager reversed his decision, publicly embarrassing and upsetting Albanese. After the last 
episode Albanese went home with chest pains, nausea, sweating, shortness of breath, and 
dizziness. He never worked again. Id. at 14-15, 389 N.E.2d at 84. The court, relying on 
Fitzgibbons' Case, 374 Mass. 633, 373 N.E.2d 1174 (1978), held that Albanese was entitled 
to compensation, finding that an employee who suffers a mental injury "causally related to 
a series of specific stressful work-related incidents" can recover compensation. Albanese's 
Case, 378 Mass. at 14-15, 389 N.E.2d at 84. 
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pacity compensation benefits!7 under section 34 of the workers' 
compensation act.!S The appeals court affirmed the judgment of the 
superior court.!9 
III. ANALYSIS 
Professor Arthur Larson developed three categories for analyzing 
workers' compensation cases involving either mental causation or 
emotional injury: 
(1) physical injury caused by mental stimulus; 
(2) nervous injury caused by physical trauma; 
(3) nervous injury caused by mental stimulus.2o 
Currently, cases in the first and second categories almost always 
are found compensable as long as other statutory requirements are 
met2! because something exists "to satisfy the old-fashioned legal insis­
tence upon something 'physical.' "22 The third category remains a 
battleground in some states,23 although a majority of jurisdictions sup­
16. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 729, 462 N.E.2d at 350. The decision of the review­
ing board is final unless it is unsupported by the evidence or a "different conclusion is 
required as a matter of law." Id. at 729 n.3, 462 N.E.2d 350 n.3 (quoting Corraro's Case, 
380 Mass. 357, 359, 403 N.E.2d 388,390 (1980». Tbejudge in Kelly's Case accepted the 
reviewing board's finding of facts but reversed because Kelly was entitled to compensation 
as a matter of law. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 729 n.3, 462 N.E.2d at 350 n.3. 
17. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 729, 462 N.E.2d at 350. 
18. MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 152, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984). Section 34 
sets compensation using a formula based on two thirds of claimant's weekly wage, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage in the Commonwealth. Id. 
19. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 727, 462 N.E.2d at 349. 
20. Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. 
REV. 1243 (1970). 
21. Id. 
22. IB A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23 (1982 & 
Supp. 1984). See also Larson, supra note 20, at 1251. 
23. The coutts that have denied compensation for nervous injury resulting from 
mental trauma are Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. For a state-by-state analysis of 
cases, see LARSON, supra note 22, § 42.23 n.82. See also Larson, supra note 20, at 1243, 
1253. Rapid change toward favoring compensability has occurred since Larson stated in 
1970 that on the issue of compensability, cases in the third category were evenly divided. 
Id. at 1243. The court in Fitzgibbons Case cited the Larson article. 374 Mass. 633, 638, 
373 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (1978). 
In the landmark case of Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 
315 (1955), the employee suffered numerous debilitating nervous symptoms and inability to 
work after an accident involving himself and a co-worker. Id. at 432,279 S.W.2d at 316. 
In the accident, scaffolding collapsed, causing the co-worker to plunge to his death. Id. 
The claimant believed he would be killed as well, but a cable prevented his fall. Id. A 
superior structural steelworker, he developed a fear of working in high places after the 
accident. Id. He received compensation despite statutory language that required "damage 
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ports compensability.24 
A long line of Massachusetts case law supports compensation in 
the first two categories.25 In Charon's Case,26 for example, claimant 
suffered a left-side paralysis caused by her fright when lightning struck 
the plant where she worked.27 Although she suffered no physical im­
pact, the supreme judicial court reversed a decree denying compensa­
tion, stating that the statute did not deny recovery merely because 
there was injury without physical impact or other "external violence 
to the body."28 Charon is notable because at the time no recovery 
existed at common law for an injury caused entirely by fright or other 
form of mental disturbance.29 The Charon court distinguished Spade 
v. Lynn & Boston R.R.,30 the controlling case, stating that the princi­
ple enunciated in Spade for denying recovery could not be extended to 
workers' compensation cases.3\ 
The Workmen's Compensation Act represented a response to the 
inadequacy of the tort negligence system. The Act permits compensa­
tion to employees for injuries causally related to their work. 32 The 
courts have liberally allowed compensation because the Act requires 
an employee at the outset of employment to choose either the right to 
bring an action in tort or coverage under workers' compensation as the 
sole remedy for an industrial injury.33 The Act has a twofold purpose: 
or harm to the physical structure of the body." Id. at 435-36,279 S.W.2d at 318. The 
Texas court denied that an injury that prevented the body from functioning properly could 
be outside the definition of "harm." Id. at 436,279 S.W.2d at 318-19. 
24. The courts that have permitted compensation for nervous injury resulting from 
mental trauma are federal, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mas­
sachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ten­
nessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. For a state-by-state analysis of 
cases, see LARSON, supra note 22, § 42.23 n.81. 
25. Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E.2d 844 (1954); McMurray's Case, 331 Mass. 
29, 116 N.E.2d 847 (1954); Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947); Caswell's 
Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940); Hunnewell's Case, 220 Mass. 351, 107 N.E. 
934 (1915); Hale's Case, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 769, 340 N.E.2d 921 (1976). 
26. 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947). 
27. Id. at 695, 75 N.E.2d at 512. 
28. Id. at 696, 75 N.E.2d at 512. 
29. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
30. Id. 
31. Charon, 321 Mass. at 696, 75 N.E.2d at 513. 
32. 29 LOCKE, supra note 10, § 1. 
33. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976). See. e.g., Foley v. 
Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545,413 N.E.2d 711 (1980) (employee barred from bringing an 
action in tort against his employer because he failed to give timely written notice and his 
injuries were compensable under § 26 of the Act); Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 498, 111 
N.E. 379, 384 (1916) (Workmen'S Compensation Act is not compulsory. Employers need 
not eJect it, and employees may choose to stand on their legal rights and forego coverage.); 
Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N.E. 1 (1914) (under Part I section 5 of the Act, 
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to compensate "personal injury arising out of and in the course of' 
employment;34 and to make the cost of personal injuries resulting from 
employment part of the employer's cost of doing business.35 Courts 
have broadly defined "personal injury" as "lesion or change in any 
part of the system" which produces harm or pain or decreases the 
natural ability to function. 36 
When it enacted the statute, the legislature followed the English 
acts of 1897 and 190637 in general form and in many particulars38 but 
with the significant difference that the English act compensates only 
"personal injury by accident."39 Because the Massachusetts Act has 
no "by accident" requirement, "gradually developed injuries are com­
pensable as well as those caused by sudden incidents."4O The effect of 
the distinction can be seen in Hurle's Case,41 in which the court held 
claimant's blindness, resulting from long-term, repeated exposures to 
poisonous coal-tar gases, to be a "personal injury" within the meaning 
of the Act.42 The court rejected defense analogies to English case law 
and arguments that the legislature had not intended to allow recovery 
for long-range injuries.43 "Injury" was read as an "inclusive word" 
that referred not merely to accidents.44 In Madden's Case45 the 
supreme judicial court affirmed a compensatory award for disability 
due to the effect of hard work on a weak heart and noted that "per­
sonal injury" is a broader concept than "personal injury by 
accident."46 
The Massachusetts Act thus provides liberal compensation, has 
no "by accident" requirement, permits compensation for gradually de­
veloping injuries, and includes a broad definition of "personal injury." 
Within this framework, Larson's third category of cases-nervous in-
employee held to have waived her right of action at common law as she did not give notice 
in writing of intent to preserve the right when she was hired.) 
34. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976). 
35. Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 494-95, III N.E. 379, 382 (1916). 
36. Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8, \2, 105 N.E. 601, 603 (1914). 
37. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897,60 & 61 VICT., ch. 37, § 1(1); Workmen's 
Compensation Act, 1906, 6 EDW. VII, ch. 58, § 1(1). 
38. Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487,489, III N.E. 379, 380 (1916). 
39. Id. at 490, III N.E. at 380. 
40. Zerofski's Case, 385 Mass 590, 592, 433 N.E.2d 869, 871 (1982). 
41. 217 Mass. 223, 104 N.E. 336 (1914). 
42. Id. at 227, 104 N.E. at 339. 
43. Id. at 225-26, 104 N.E. at 338. 
44. Id. 
45. Madden, 222 Mass. 487, III N.E. 379 (1916). 
46. Id. at 490, III N.E. at 381. 
370 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:365 
jury caused by mental stimulus47-presented special problems. On the 
one hand, the common law traditionally denied recovery for nervous 
injuries caused by emotional trauma largely because of the difficulty of 
establishing emotional distress and the apprehension of "frivolous and 
fraudulent claims. "48 The court in Spade v. Lynn & Boston RR. stated 
that the difficulty of administering any other system was the real rea­
son for refusing damages for injuries caused by emotional distress.49 
On the other hand, the court had no valid reason to deny recovery for 
"mental or emotional disorders caused by mental or emotional 
trauma"50 in workers' compensation cases. 
In Fitzgibbons' Case 51 the supreme judicial court, finding the 
claimant was exposed to extraordinary stress at work,52 for the first 
time permitted compensation for a mental disorder causally connected 
to mental trauma that "arose out of the employment looked at in any 
of its aspects."53 The court refined the standard in Albanese's Case,54 
requiring two conditions for compensation: first, "identifiable stressful 
work-related incidents" that occurred over a relatively short time, and 
second, a "causal nexus" between emotional injury and working con­
ditions.55 Before Fitzgibbons, the court had not focused on the lack of 
a physical element in the injury. Rather it had denied recovery be­
cause there was no evidence connecting the stressful precipitating 
event to the employment,56 or because the facts brought the case 
under the "wear and tear" doctrine. 57 In both Albanese and Fitzgib­
bons, the existence of a causal link between the injury and specific 
47. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
48. 4A PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES (MB), D. BINDER, 
FRIGHT, SHOCK, AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS § 1.02 (L. Frumer ed.1982). 
49. 168 Mass. at 288, 47 N.E. at 89. 
50. Fitzgibbon's Case; 374 Mass. 633, 638, 373 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (1978) (citing 
McMurray's Case, 33( Mass. 29, 116 N.E.2d 847 (1954); lA LARSON, supra note 22, 
§ 42.23). 
51. 374 Mass. 633, 373 N.E.2d 1174 (1978). 
52. Id. at 638, 373 N.E.2d at 1177. Fitzgibbons, a supervisory corrections officer, 
ordered some prisoners moved. A scuffle ensued in which one officer became ill. He was 
later pronounced dead. Fitzgibbons became upset, started shaking, and began to cry. Phy­
sicians diagnosed his condition as an acute anxiety reaction. He received medication on the 
initial hospital visit and later from his own physician, but he was unable to work again. He 
died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound six weeks after the incident. Id. at 633, 373 N.E.2d 
at 1174. 
53. Id. at 638, 373 N.E.2d at 1178. 
54. 378 Mass. 14, 389 N.E.2d 83 (1979). See supra note 15. 
55. 378 Mass. at 18, 389 N.E.2d at 86. 
56. Fitzgibbons, 374 Mass. at 639, 373 N.E.2d at 1178. 
57. See, e.g., Korsun's Case, 354 Mass. 124,235 N.E.2d 814 (1968) (court focused on 
the causal nexus and denied recovery because the employee's death from a heart attack was 
induced by apprehension over the prospect of losing his job and did not arise "out of the 
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events at work constituted the significant factor that permitted 
recovery. 58 
Because no requirement exists in the Act that the work-related 
injury occur "by accident,"59 courts developed alternatives to limit lia­
bility for gradually developing physical injuries. In 1913 the court 
narrowed the concept of "arising out of and in the course of employ­
ment" by requiring that injury, to be compensable, not only result 
from conditions at work, but that those conditions be required by the 
work.60 The doctrine of "wear and tear" originated in 191761 and 
grew out of a narrow interpretation of the statutory language and the 
concepts of "personal injury" and "arising out of and in the course of 
employment."62 The doctrine limited insurers' liability by excluding 
from the definition of personal injury within the meaning of the Act 
injuries resulting from long years of hard work. 63 The court appar­
ently abandoned the narrow reading of "arising out of' in 1940,64 
holding that an injury satisfied the requirement if it arose "out of the 
nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment looked 
at in any of its aspects. "65 The wear and tear doctrine remained dor­
mant from 194666 until 196867 when the court revived it in Begin's 
nature, conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employment," (quoting Caswell's Case, 
305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940». 
58. Albanese, 378 Mass. at 18, 389 N.E.2d at 86; Fitzgibbon's, 374 Mass. at 638, 373 
N.E.2d at 1177-78. See also 1B LARSON, supra note 22, § 38.83. Larson identifies the 
fundamental causation issue as the center of the battle in Massachusetts. 
59. "By accident" requirements do not exist in the workers' compensation statutes of 
only eight states: California, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and South Dakota. 1B LARSON, supra note 22, § 37.10 n.1. 
60. McNichol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913) (emphasis added) (injury 
was noncompensable as it could have been avoided had employee changed his posture at 
work). 
61. Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57,61, 116 N.E. 972,974 (1917). See also 29 LocKE, 
supra note 10, § 175. 
62. MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 152, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976). 
63. Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 972 (1917). 
64. Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940). 
65. Id. at 502, 26 N.E.2d at 330. See also 29 LOCKE, supra note 10, § 175. "The 
wear and tear cases were productive of much hardship and injustice to the working people 
of Massachusetts. . . . It was difficult . . . to draw the line between disability resulting 
from a series of strains, held to be compensable, and those resulting from bodily wear and 
tear." Id. 
66. Spalla's Case, 320 Mass. 416, 69 N.E.2d 665 (1946). See also 29 LOCKE, supra 
note 10, § 175. But see McMurray's Case, 331 Mass. 29, 32-33, 116 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1954) 
(The court upheld compensation award for a heart attack induced by job-related stress but 
noted that a line existed between wear and tear cases and those in which an employee 
received a strain in performing his work). While the line might be difficult to determine, it 
does exist. 
67. Begin's Case, 354 Mass. 594, 238 N.E.2d 864 (1968). 
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Case 68 for nervous injury cases. The insurers in Fitzgibbons 69 and AI­
banese70 raised wear and tear as a defense but in each case the pres­
ence of identifiable triggering incidents permitted recovery. The court 
strongly reaffirmed the wear and tear doctrine for gradually develop­
ing physical injuries in ZeroJski's Case 71 but noted that the line sepa­
rating compensable injury and noncompensable injury resulting from 
"wear and tear" was a "delicate one."72 Nevertheless the ZeroJski 
court believed the line a necessary one to preserve the character of the 
Act.73 
The insurer in Kelly's Case raised the wear and tear doctrine as a 
defense74 and also characterized the employee as a person who col­
lapsed under the ordinary, day-to-day stresses of her work.7s The ap­
peals court found the arguments unconvincing because there were two 
"identifiable stressful work-related incidents," which proved a causal 
nexus and a stress greater than ordinary.76 The court's approach ig­
nored the fact that mental disease generally cannot be linked to a spe­
cific event, resulting rather from the complex interaction of a number 
of factors.77 Limiting compensation to cases in which a claimant can 
identify an abnormally stressful single event may result in an artificial 
68. Id. 
69. 374 Mass. at 638, 373 N.E.2d at 1177. 
70. 378 Mass. at 18, 389 N.E.2d at 86. 
71. 385 Mass. 590,433 N.E.2d 869 (1982). 
72. Id. at 594,433 N.E.2d at 871. To qualify for compensation for gradually devel­
oping physical injuries, a causal nexus must exist between employment and the injury, but 
"causation [alone] ... is an inadequate test" in situations in which any of a number of 
activities that could have been pursued in the place of employment would have contributed 
to the injury. Id. at 594, 433 N.E.2d at 872. The court restated the range of harm covered 
by the Act in order to clarify the full analysis necessary for compensability. "To be com­
pensable, the harm must arise either from a specific incident or series of incidents at work, 
or from an identifiable condition that is not common and necessary to all or a great many 
occupations. The injury need not be unique to the trade, and need not. . . result from the 
fault of the employer. But it must ... be identified with the employment." Id. at 594-95, 
433 N.E.2d at 872. 
See, e.g., Begin's Case, 354 Mass. 594, 238 N.E.2d 864 (1968); Maggelet's Case, 228 
Mass. 57,116 N.E. 972 (1917); Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, III N.E. 379 (1916). 
73. ZeroJski, 385 Mass. at 594,433 N.E.2d at 871. 
74. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 730, 462 N.E.2d at 350. 
75. Id. at 729-30, 462 N.E.2d at 350. See also Korsun's Case, 354 Mass. 124, 235 
N.E.2d 814 (1968) (the insurer denied compensation to an employee whose heart attack 
was causally related to the employee's fear of losing his job because of an incident at work). 
ArguablyKorsun's case was stronger than Kelly'S because the injury was physical rather 
than emotional. The Kelly court rejected the analogy and held that Korsun's Case was 
inapplicable to the facts in Kelly. 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 731, 462 N.E.2d at 351. 
76. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 732-33, 462 N.E.2d at 351 (quoting Albanese, 378 at 
18, 389 N.E.2d at 86). 
77. See generally A. Buss, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY (1966). 
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limit on recovery similar to the outdated requirement of physical im­
pact for recovery in emotional distress cases.78 
The Massachusetts courts have not yet developed a methodology 
for determining compensability for work-related mental injuries of 
gradual onset, which is a more intractable problem.79 Several con­
cerns present themselves. First, a danger exists that courts will lose 
sight of the purposes of the Act,80 and that it will gradually become a 
form of health and accident insurance. 81 Second, a potential exists for 
large extensions of liability, especially in jurisdictions with no "by ac­
cident" requirement. 82 Employers may pass along the resultant higher 
insurance rates to consumers. Third, mental illness generally results 
from a variety of causes, only one of which is stress at work. Society 
may be able to develop more efficient ways to compensate for such 
injuries rather than labelling them a cost of doing business. Examples 
include payments under unemployment compensation or social secur­
ity disability.83 Fourth, liberal compensation may generate more liti­
gation. Because of the high potential cost of compensation, employers 
have an incentive to appeal adverse decisions, especially after the 
strong reaffirmation of the wear and tear doctrine in Zerojski. 84 Fifth, 
employers may be reluctant to hire unstable workers or those with a 
history of treatment for mental illness because of uncertainty over the 
extent of liability. 85 Finally, the presence of available compensation 
may discourage recovery in employees suffering from psychoneurotic 
injuries. Financial aid, serving as a disincentive to getting well, may 
lengthen the duration of the psychoneurotic illness and may, therefore, 
be incompatible with the aim of rehabilitation.86 
78. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
79. The courts in Zerofski, 385 Mass. at 595 n.3, 433 N.E.2d at 872 n.3; Albanese, 
378 Mass. at 18 n.4, 389 N.E.2d at 86 n.4; and Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 731, 462 N.E.2d 
at 350-51, stated they were not addressing this issue. 
80. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
81. Madden, 222 Mass. at 494-95, 111 N.E. at 382 ("The act is not a substitute for 
disability or old age pensions"). See also Note, Determining the Compensability ofMental 
Disability Under Workers' Compensation, 55 So. CAL. L. REV. 193 (1981). 
82. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. 
83. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 733, 462 N.E.2d at 352. 
84. 385 Mass. 590, 433 N.E.2d 869. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. See 
also Note, supra note 81, at 240-41; 29 LOCKE, supra note 10. 
85. See Note, supra note 81, at 244. The author suggests that with issues of mixed 
causation, the "existence of other factors in a worker's life that contribute significantly to 
the development of a mental disability should not preclude compensation, but should create 
a rebuttable presumption on behalf of the employer that the alleged mental disability is not 
sufficiently work-related to be compensable." Id. 
86. Cohen, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE 
L.J. 1129, 1146-47 (1961); Note, supra note 81, at 240-41. 
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Massachusetts erected barriers to open-ended liability in the wear 
and tear doctrine87 and the requirement of "identifiable stressful work­
related incidents" causally related to the injury.88 The solution is not 
entirely satisfactory. 89 Larson criticizes the distinction Massachusetts 
draws between identifiable work related incidents and "gradual stimu­
lus" as "unsound" and an incorrect way of drawing the line.90 He 
suggests that a better approach would be to distinguish between "grad­
ual stimuli that are sufficiently more damaging than those of everyday 
employment life to satisfy the normal 'arising-out-of test, and those 
that are not."91 While the present Massachusetts approach does not 
explicitly deny compensation to claimants with mental injuries of 
gradual onset, a claimant's inability to satisfy the Albanese test would 
bar recovery.92 Larson believes this approach denies compensation to 
claimants with work-connected injuries who deserve to be 
compensated.93 
The Kelly court identified the "Wisconsin rule" or "objective 
test" as the emerging trend.94 The test asks, first, whether the work 
environment subjected the claimant to extraordinary stresses and 
strains, and second, whether the stresses caused the claimant's disabil­
ity.95 Because of the unique development of workers' compensation 
law in Massachusetts, the usefulness to Massachusetts of law from 
other jurisdictions remains problematical. 96 
The insurer did not convince the Kelly court that compensation 
for mental injuries should be denied because of the difficulty of sub­
87. 	 See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text. 
88. Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 18, 389 N.E.2d 83, 86 (1979). 
89. 	 See supra notes 59-76 and accompanying text. 
90. IB LARSON, supra note 22, § 42.23[b]. 
91. 	 Id. 
92. 	 Albanese, 378 Mass. at 18, 389 N.E.2d at 86. 
93. IB LARSON, supra note 22, § 42.23[b]. 
94. 	 Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 731 n.6, 462 N.E.2d at 351 n.6. 
95. Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 
2d 46,50,240 N.W.2d 128, 130 (1974); School District # 1 v. Department ofIndus., Labor 
& Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 370,378,215 N.W.2d 370, 377 (1974). See also IB LAR­
SON, supra note 22, § 42.23[b); Note, supra note 81, at 240. Cj 29 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 
188. 	 Locke would go further: 
If the employee's disability or death is the result of the general stress of his ordi­
nary work, it is a proper subject for compensation. If. . . it is the result of the 
general stress of everyday life, to allow compensation would be to convert the act 
into a scheme of general health insurance. The question should not be one of law, 
but of fact for the determination of the board. 
Id. 
96. 	 See Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 731-32, 462 N.E.2d at 351. 
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stantiation.97 In Zerojski,98 the court suggested that a "stricter stan­
dard of proof might apply to cases involving gradually developing 
mental illness."99 The Maine court developed a possible solution, pro­
viding that employees could recover if they could prove either that 
they experienced greater stresses or tensions than other employees, or 
by clear and convincing evidence show that the ordinary stresses at 
work were the principal cause of injury.loo The Kelly court, however, 
addressed itself less to the problem of gradually developing mental ill­
ness and more to the extension of liability that the decision pre­
saged. 101 The court invited the legislature and the supreme judicial 
court to consider whether employees should recover workers' compen­
sation for mental injury caused by employers' good faith business deci­
sions to layoff or transfer workers.102 Unless the decision in Korsun's 
Case 103 acts as a barrier, the courts could use the Wisconsin ap­
proach,l04 determining whether as a general rule layoffs and transfers 
are ordinary or extraordinary stress. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Kelly's Case is the most recent in a series of cases decided since 
1978105 in which the courts have allowed recovery under the workers' 
compensation act for mental injury caused by mental stimulus. Two 
conditions must exist for recovery: (1) an identifiable stressful work­
related incident or series of incidents, and (2) causal connection to the 
injury.106 The decisions clearly and repeatedly indicate that the Act 
will not allow compensation for injuries resulting from normal "wear 
and tear."107 The remaining issue to be resolved by the Massachusetts 
courts concerns the ability of employees to recover under the Act for 
97. Id. at 732, 462 N.E.2d at 351-52. 
98. 385 Mass. at 595 n.3, 433 N.E.2d at 872 n.3. 
99. Id. 
100. Pomerleau v. United Parcel Serv., 464 A.2d 206, 208 (Me. 1983) (quoting 
Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Me. 1979». 
101. Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 733, 462 N.E.2d at 352. 
102. Id. 
103. 354 Mass. 124, 235 N.E.2d 814 (1968). "Apprehension over the prospect of 
losing one's job does not arise out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the 
employment. . . . The added emotional distress was. . . a personal idiosyncracy and was 
not connected with his work." Id. at 128,235 N.E.2d at 816. The court in Kelly consid­
ered Korsun's Case "to have been limited by later decisions." Kelly, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 
731,462 N.E.2d at 351. 
104. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
105. Fitzgibbons, 374 Mass. 633, 373 N.E.2d 1174. 
106. Albanese, 378 Mass. at 15, 389 N.E.2d at 86. 
107. See supra 61-73 and accompanying text. 
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mental disorders of gradual onset caused by mental trauma arising out 
of their employment. 
Eileen Sorrentino 
